Assessment of the possible scenario of a NATO-Russia conflict

Assessment of the possible scenario of a NATO-Russia conflict

The President of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Bruno Kahl, has warned that Russia could be in a position to attack NATO territory by 2030 at the latest. At the same time, the Estonian EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas was quoted as saying that a possible attack scenario from 2028 (within the next three to five years) is realistic. Both statements underline the growing concern about military escalation, although the time frames mentioned vary slightly.

Other analysts and politicians such as the Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen or experts from the German Council on Foreign Relations also emphasized the need to prepare for a potential threat.

Therefore, today an assessment of the danger of war in Europe and the possible consequences of a war.

A war between NATO and Russia would not be a classic ground war with massive tank armies, as has happened historically (e.g. in World War II). Instead, a multidimensional hybrid war is likely, combining the following elements:

Missile and air war against strategic targets

• Destruction of critical infrastructure:
• Both sides would try to attack enemy logistics centers, airports, energy facilities (e.g. power grids, gas pipelines) and communication systems with cruise missiles (e.g. Russian Iskanders, NATO Tomahawks) and drones. This would cripple the enemy’s combat capability without deploying large ground forces.
  • Example: Russia could use Kaliningrad as a missile base to hit targets in Eastern Europe.
  • NATO would respond with F-35 fighter jets and hypersonic weapons.
• Cyber ​​attacks as a first strike:
• Before physical attacks, widespread cyber attacks on government networks, banks or hospitals would be expected to create chaos.

Limited ground war in key regions

• Focus on NATO’s eastern flank:
• Russia could try to quickly occupy areas in the Baltics or Eastern Europe (e.g. Suwalki Gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad) to destabilize NATO. However, this would face massive resistance:
  • NATO battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are already reinforced.
  • The US is stationing heavy Abrams tanks in Poland, which could slow an advance.
• Asymmetric warfare: Russia would likely use paramilitary groups (like Wagner) or proxies (e.g. Belarus) to provoke border conflicts while officially avoiding direct confrontation.

Naval and economic war

• Blockades in the Baltic/Arctic: Russia could block shipping routes in the Baltic Sea to interrupt NATO’s supply lines. NATO would try to exert counterpressure with naval units (e.g. German frigates).
• Attacks on submarine cables: The destruction of global data cables (such as in the North Atlantic) would paralyze communication between Europe and the USA.

Nuclear threat and escalation dynamics

• Targeted threat of nuclear weapons: Russia has repeatedly emphasized that it would use tactical nuclear weapons (e.g. on Iskander missiles) if the country’s “existential security” was threatened. NATO could respond with comparable US nuclear weapons in Europe.
  • A limited nuclear strike (e.g. on military bases) would be conceivable to force a surrender – but this would entail the risk of a global nuclear war.

Social attrition through hybrid tactics

• Disinformation campaigns: Russia would try to divide the EU population through fake news about high losses or alleged NATO provocations.
• Energy and migration crises as a weapon: Controlled refugee flows from Africa (via Belarus) or targeted gas shortages could destabilize Europe.

Realistic forecast: Short, highly technical conflict with an unclear outcome

• No long-term trench warfare: Both sides would have an interest in ending the conflict quickly to avoid escalation or economic collapse. NATO would try to push Russia back through precision strikes and electronic warfare, while Russia would focus on disrupting NATO communications and territorial gains.
• Consequences: Even a short-term war would severely damage European infrastructure, collapse global supply chains and force millions to flee. The psychological burden of cyber attacks and nuclear threats would be enormous.

Conclusion: Prevention remains crucial

Military experts such as former NATO General Philip Breedlove emphasize that war is never inevitable. Current preparations serve as a deterrent – but a diplomatic solution through dialogue (e.g. via the OSCE) remains the only way to prevent a catastrophe.

NATO preparations and the Operational Plan Germany

NATO and Germany in particular are intensifying their preparations for a possible conflict with Russia. The “Operational Plan Germany” is a central part of this strategy. It includes detailed measures for the event of a defense, including securing critical infrastructure such as energy and communication networks and preparing the population for bottlenecks caused by energy shortages or personnel shortages. For example, the Bundeswehr is encouraging companies to strengthen energy self-sufficiency and crisis resilience, and the population is being asked to stockpile supplies such as water, batteries and canned goods.

At NATO level, defense capabilities are being increased through military buildup, including the stationing of troops in Eastern Europe and the modernization of the armed forces. Experts such as NATO Lieutenant General Alexander Sollfrank emphasize that Russia could try to destroy rear lines of communication in Europe, which is why logistics and cyber defense are being prioritized. In addition, the overall defense strategy is being revitalized, which links civilian and military resources to ward off hybrid attacks (e.g. disinformation) and conventional threats.

Germany and NATO are also emphasizing the need to reduce political dependencies – for example in the energy sector – and increase investments in defense. This is reflected in initiatives such as the goal of consistently implementing the 2% GDP target of NATO members and the relocation of military resources to Central and Eastern European states. The operational plan is not so much about preparing for an active attack, but rather about being able to react in the event of a crisis. Overall, it shows a combination of structural resilience, military deterrence and civil crisis prevention in order to be able to react to potential escalations.

NATO’s preparations, including the planning of land corridors for troop and tank movements (), are on the one hand part of preventive military logistics in order to be prepared for multiple scenarios, and on the other hand a means of deterrence. The fact that a direct war is considered unlikely does not mean that no precautions are taken for an emergency. Here are the key aspects:

Deterrence through preparation

Military alliances such as NATO always plan for worst-case scenarios in order to deter potential opponents from attacks. The publicly known exercises and logistics concepts (e.g. rapid movement of US troops via “land corridors”) are intended to signal that an attack on NATO territory would be expensive. Similar plans already existed during the Cold War, without a direct conflict occurring.

Response to Russian threat perception

Since 2022, Russia has massively increased its troop strength on the western border (over 1 million soldiers including reservists) and regularly deploys tactical nuclear weapons near NATO territory (e.g. Belarus). NATO is responding to this with defensive planning, not offensive strategies. These include:

• Infrastructure adjustments: Railway lines and ports are being upgraded to be able to transport heavy weapons systems (e.g. Abrams tanks).
• Scenario exercises: Maneuvers such as “Defender 2024” simulate the defense of the Baltic states or Poland, not attacks on Russian territory.

Risk of uncontrolled escalation

Even if a planned large-scale war is unlikely, local incidents could escalate (e.g. border violations, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure). NATO is therefore planning precise mobilization routes in order to be able to act quickly in an emergency – a defensive, not an aggressive step].

Propaganda and divergence from reality

The headlines about an “impending ground war” often reflect political narratives:

• Russian portrayal: Presents NATO exercises as evidence of “expansion intentions”.
• Western portrayal: Emphasizes the purely defensive orientation of the plans.
• Actual facts: Military strategies and media reports always diverge. The existence of emergency plans is standard, but not evidence of concrete war intentions.

Assessment

NATO’s plans are a logical consequence of the deteriorating security situation in Europe since 2014. The probability of a direct war remains low, as both sides know the existential consequences (including nuclear risk). At the same time, however, it would be negligent to forego preparations – if only to demonstrate the ability to act in crisis situations.

Consequences of a war between Russia and NATO for the European population

A direct war between Russia and NATO would have devastating effects on the European population, both through immediate fighting and long-term destabilizing consequences:

1. Massive civilian casualties and destruction:

Eastern European states on NATO’s eastern flank in particular would be exposed to direct military attacks, which could lead to high casualty numbers, destroyed infrastructure (e.g. residential areas, hospitals, power grids) and chemical or nuclear threats. NATO has already prepared evacuation plans for affected regions, but capacities would be limited.

2. Energy and supply crises:

Attacks on critical infrastructure such as pipelines, power grids or ports could lead to widespread blackouts, heating failures and shortages of food or medicine. The “Operational Plan Germany” is already calling on the population to stock up, which indicates acute supply risks.

3. Economic collapse:

Sanctions against Russia would be drastically tightened, which could lead to energy price explosions, the collapse of supply chains and mass unemployment. Europe’s dependence on Russian raw materials (e.g. gas) would be difficult to compensate for in the short term.

4. Refugee movements and humanitarian disasters:

Millions of people from Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland, Baltic states) would flee to Western Europe, which could trigger overloaded social systems, tensions between population groups and a worsening of the housing crisis. The Ukraine conflict is already showing similar effects.

5. Hybrid attacks and disinformation:

Cyberattacks on banks, hospitals or authorities as well as manipulative propaganda would undermine social trust and fuel panic. This could lead to political instability and intra-European conflicts.

6. Military mobilization and restrictions:

A revival of conscription in many NATO countries would be likely, as would curfews, travel restrictions, or the compulsory commitment of civilian resources (e.g. transportation) for military purposes.

7. Long-term trauma and generational conflicts:

The psychological consequences of air raid sirens, destroyed cities, and family losses would particularly affect children and young people, similar to the current Ukraine war.

Although NATO emphasizes that war is not an inevitable consequence of current tensions, preparations for an emergency illustrate the scale of the feared humanitarian catastrophe.

Media and preparation for (potential) war

The role of the media in “preparing” the population for a potential war is an ambivalent issue that includes both strategic communication by governments/NATO and critical discourses about war propaganda. Here is a factual analysis:

Official communication: “Resilience” and threat scenarios

• Raising awareness of the problem: Governments and the media are increasingly pointing to real threats (e.g. statements by the BND, Russia’s war in Ukraine) and emphasizing the need for civil resilience. Example:
  • The “Operations Plan Germany” is discussed in media such as the FAZ or the Spiegel to point out bottlenecks (energy, medicines) and to call for stockpiling.
  • Documents such as the White Paper of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) call for citizens to be made “crisis-resistant” with the help of educational programs and media campaigns.
• Normalization of military measures: Media reports on rearmament (e.g. the Bundeswehr’s 100 billion special fund) and the stationing of NATO troops in Eastern Europe are often justified with reference to “self-defense.” This is intended to strengthen acceptance of higher military spending.

Framing: enemy images and polarization

• “Putin sympathizer” narrative: Critics of NATO policy or those calling for de-escalation are generally discredited in some media as “Putin sympathizers.” This polarizes the public debate in order to marginalize criticism of the military deterrence policy.
• Humanitarian solidarity campaigns: Media reports on Ukrainian war victims (e.g. killed civilians) or initiatives such as “Unbreakable Ukraine” generate empathy and support the legitimacy of Western support. However, this can also increase acceptance of military means.

Military-strategic influence on the media

• Involvement of experts: Security authorities such as the BND or NATO-affiliated think tanks (e.g. DGAP) provide the media with analyses that illustrate threat scenarios. Critics such as the journalist Patrick Sensburg warn against a “military-influenced interpretive sovereignty” in the public.
• Media cooperation: In documentaries (e.g. ARD/ZDF), scenarios of a hybrid war (cyber attacks, disinformation) are increasingly being dramatized in order to sensitize the population to “hybrid threats”.

Criticism: Accusation of preparing for war

• Civil society warnings: NGOs such as the peace movement or journalists (e.g. Jürgen Todenhöfer) criticize the fact that the media promote a “war mentality” through one-sided reporting. Example:
  • The focus on military solutions (instead of diplomacy) in talk shows.
  • Rare discussion of arms exports or western provocations (e.g. NATO’s eastward expansion).
• “Image of Russia as the enemy”: Studies such as the “Media Service Integration” show that Russian positions are often simplified or taken out of context. This reinforces the perception of Russia as the sole aggressor.

Conclusion: Between education and manipulation

Media representation moves between a legitimate obligation to inform (e.g. about the Putin regime, real threats) and the danger of emotional preparation for war. While governments claim that they are only preparing the population for crises, pacifists and media ethicists warn of a creeping “normalization of war” through language (e.g. “We must become able to defend ourselves”) and selective reporting.

Sources for further analysis:

• ARD documentary “Fear of war – How safe is Europe?” (2025)
• BAKS publication “Total defense and media communication” (2024)
• Study by the Hans Bredow Institute on war reporting (2025)

An ethical consideration remains: When does media education serve security – and when does it become war propaganda?

The role of propaganda and censorship in preparing for a possible war is a complex and controversial topic. Here is a differentiated analysis:

Propaganda: a tool for manipulating opinion

• State narratives: Governments and NATO institutions use targeted communication to emphasize threat scenarios. Example:
  • The repetition of statements such as “Russia wants to attack NATO” (for example by experts such as Bruno Kahl) is intended to create acceptance for rearmament.
  • Campaigns such as “Resilience instead of fear” (Federal Government, 2024) aim to prepare the population for crises – what critics call “preparation for the logic of war”.
• Emotional mobilization: Media reports on war atrocities in Ukraine (e.g. destroyed cities, killed children) generate sympathy, but also distancing from Russia. This can be used to support military measures (arms deliveries, sanctions).
• Disinformation campaigns: Both sides (NATO countries and Russia) accuse each other of spreading false information. Example:
  • Russia portrays itself as a “victim of Western aggression” in order to secure domestic political approval.
  • NATO-affiliated media use terms such as “Putin’s war of aggression” without contextualizing historical tensions.

Censorship: Control of information flows

• Restriction of critical voices: In some NATO countries, social media accounts or articles that address the role of NATO’s eastward expansion, for example, are blocked as “Putin propaganda” (e.g. citing EU disinformation guidelines).
  • In Germany, a law was passed in 2024 that criminalizes “systematic disinformation” – according to civil rights organizations, an infringement on freedom of expression.
• One-sided reporting: State-funded media (e.g. Deutsche Welle) report heavily from a Western perspective. Counterstatements (e.g. Russian views on sanctions) are given less space.
• Military secrecy: Documents such as the “Operations Plan Germany” are only partially publicly accessible. Critics suspect that governments deliberately stir up fear in order to minimize resistance.

Countermovements: Media criticism and civil resistance

• Peace initiatives: Groups such as “Scientists for Peace” or “Media Rebels” criticize that propaganda could trigger a self-fulfilling prophecy. They demand transparency and de-escalating dialogues.
• Independent media: Platforms such as Telepolis or Rubikon uncover topics that receive little attention in the mainstream media (e.g. NATO maneuvers near Russian borders). However, these are often marginalized as “critical of the system.”
• Legal steps: NGOs such as Reporters Without Borders file lawsuits against censorship measures and point to the fundamental right to freedom of information.

Conclusion: Between security and freedom of expression

Propaganda and censorship officially serve to “protect the population”, but they pose the risk of stifling democratic debates. While legitimate security interests exist (e.g. defense against hybrid cyber attacks), ethics experts warn of a “climate of fear” that suppresses critical questions. The challenge is to prevent education about real risks from leading to preparations for war.

Example of a current conflict:

• In France, a documentary about NATO maneuvers in Eastern Europe was taken off public television in 2024 – on the grounds that it could “spread panic”.
• At the same time, the BND published a prevention report warning against Russian cyber propaganda.

The debate shows: propaganda and censorship are instruments of power that are likely to be further tightened in the event of war.

Addition: Subversive influence and competing narratives in border regions

The geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West are also manifesting themselves in states bordering Russia through non-military means. Both sides use NGOs, media and civil society groups to promote their interests, leading to mutual accusations of interference.

Regional examples

• Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina):
  • Russian initiatives: financing pro-Russian media (e.g. Sputnik Srbija), support for nationalist parties and church groups that maintain close ties with Moscow.
  • Western initiatives: NGOs supported by the EU or the US promote reforms as part of democratization or anti-corruption programs (e.g. OSCE missions, Transparency International).
  • Mutual accusations: Russia accuses the West of undermining the sovereignty of states through political conditionality (EU accession criteria). The West accuses Russia of deliberately stirring up ethnic conflicts.
• Moldova & Georgia:
  • Russia supports pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria (Moldova) as well as anti-government groups in Georgia (e.g. the “Alliance of Patriots”).
  • Western NGOs and foundations (e.g. National Democratic Institute) advise local pro-EU parties and conduct public relations work for NATO rapprochement.
• Finland & Baltic States:
• Russia uses media such as RT and online platforms to report on issues such as discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities – a narrative that Helsinki criticizes as deliberate destabilization.
• Finnish and Baltic authorities regularly document cyberattacks attributed to Russian groups.

Propaganda and media

• Bilateral instrumentalization:
• Russian state media (RT, Sputnik) emphasize “Western hegemony” and portray EU/NATO expansion as a threat.
• Western media (CNN, BBC, DW), on the other hand, often address Russian “aggression” or human rights violations.
• Lack of objectivity: Studies (e.g. by the Reuters Institute) show that reporting in crisis regions tends to be shaped by geopolitical alliances between the media’s home countries.

NGOs in the field of tension

• Russian perspective: Western NGOs are seen as the extended arm of governments that are striving for “color revolutions” (example: Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003).
• Western perspective: According to EU reports, Russia is funding “civil society” groups that spread anti-NATO sentiment (e.g. the “anti-globalization movement” in Serbia).
• Actual effect: NGOs on both sides use legal gray areas to exert influence. Whether this is considered subversive or legitimate advocacy depends on the political position.

Assessment of escalation risks

• Hybrid conflicts: The line between civil influence and covert operations is fluid. Examples:
• Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. on Finnish parliamentary servers in 2023).
• Financing of anti-government protests (accused by both sides in Belarus in 2020).
• Propaganda as a catalyst: Differences in perception exacerbate mistrust. There is no single “truth”; both sides use selective facts to legitimize their actions.

Conclusion

Subversive activities are an integral part of the current power struggle between Russia and the West. Although a direct war remains unlikely, these gray-zone conflicts create an environment in which local crises (e.g. ethnic unrest in the Balkans, cyberattacks) could escalate unplanned. Independent sources and multilateral mechanisms (e.g. OSCE observers) are crucial to separating facts from narratives – but remain limited in their effectiveness.

Should we now expect a war by 2028?

The assessment of whether a direct war between NATO and Russia by 2028 is a realistic scenario depends on a variety of geopolitical, military and economic factors. Here is a summary assessment:

Current risk factors

• Ukraine conflict: The war in Ukraine remains a central source of tension. A direct NATO intervention (e.g. by sending troops) or Russian attacks on NATO territory (e.g. by “accident”) could trigger escalations.
• Hybrid attacks: Cyber ​​attacks, disinformation campaigns or sabotage (e.g. of critical infrastructure) increase the risk of uncontrolled conflicts.
• NATO eastward expansion: The possible admission of further states (e.g. Georgia, Ukraine in the long term) could provoke Russia.

Inhibiting factors

• Nuclear deterrence: Both sides have nuclear weapons. A direct war would pose existential risks, making a direct confrontation less likely.
• Economic dependencies: Despite sanctions, there are still trade relations (e.g. raw materials, food). A war would destabilize the global economy.
• Alliance solidarity: NATO acts in accordance with the alliance case (Article 5). An attack on one member would involve all – Russia is aware of this threshold.

Realistic scenarios (2024-2028)

• No direct war: A full-scale war remains unlikely as the costs would be prohibitive for both sides.
• Limited escalation: Isolated incidents (e.g. airspace violations, cyber attacks) are possible, but are likely to be contained by crisis communication.
• Proxy conflicts: NATO and Russia could continue to act indirectly in conflicts such as Ukraine or possibly in the Baltics without directly fighting each other.

Risk assessment

• Likelihood: Currently low, but cannot be ruled out** – especially in the event of miscalculations, political power shifts (e.g. radical governments) or uncontrolled escalation spirals.
• Recommendation: The situation requires constant monitoring, diplomatic efforts and clear signals to Russia that NATO borders are sacrosanct.

Sources & further information

• Current analyses from think tanks such as RAND Corporation or CSS ETH Zurich.
• Government reports (e.g. white papers on security policy).
• Expert opinions (e.g. political scientists such as Mary Sarotte or Stephen Walt).

Last update of the assessment: February 2025 (based on the status up to 2023/24). The dynamics of the Ukraine war and domestic political developments in Russia/NATO states remain crucial.